Existence and optimality of Cournot–Nash equilibria in a bilateral oligopoly with atoms and an atomless part

被引：0

作者：

Francesca Busetto

Giulio Codognato

Sayantan Ghosal

Ludovic Julien

Simone Tonin

机构：

[1] Università degli Studi di Udine,Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche

[2] Economix,Adam Smith Business School

[3] UPL,undefined

[4] Univ Paris Nanterre,undefined

[5] CNRS,undefined

[6] University of Glasgow,undefined

来源：

International Journal of Game Theory | 2020年 / 49卷

关键词：

Bilateral oligopoly; Cournot–Nash equilibrium; Pareto optimality; C72; D43; D51;

D O I：

暂无

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学科分类号：

摘要：

We consider a bilateral oligopoly version of the Shapley window model with large traders, represented as atoms, and small traders, represented by an atomless part. For this model, we provide a general existence proof of a Cournot–Nash equilibrium that allows one of the two commodities to be held only by atoms. Then, we show, using a corollary proved by Shitovitz (Econometrica 41:467–501, 1973), that a Cournot–Nash allocation is Pareto optimal if and only if it is a Walras allocation.

引用

页码：933 / 951

页数：18