Cost Reduction, Competitive Pressure and Firms' Optimal R&D Strategies in a Duopolistic Industry

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作者
Domenico Campisi
Paolo Mancuso
Alberto Nastasi
机构
[1] Institute of Systems Analysis and Computer Science,National Research Council
[2] University of Rome “Tor Vergata”,Department of Production, Systems and Computer Science
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关键词
Noncooperative R&D; dynamic noncooperative feedback game; stock of technological knowledge; intra-industry spillovers; extra-industry R&D;
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摘要
This paper deals with a duopolistic industry where firms are engaged in cost-reducing R&D activity in order to maximize their market shares. Firms' R&D competition is characterized as a dynamic noncooperative feedback game where the optimal strategies are affected by the extra-industry R&D activity and the degree of intra-industry spillovers. Numerical simulations highlight the importance of the assumptions on the firms' absorptive capacity (to exploit external knowledge) in determining the optimal levels of firms R&D investrnents.
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页码:259 / 270
页数:11
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