Simulation analysis of the three-party evolutionary game of green building market players under carbon trading policy

Previous studies mainly focus on the game analysis of green building development under carbon tax policy, while carbon trading, as one of the important means to promote low-carbon development, is rarely mentioned in promoting the development of the green building market. Based on this, to study the impact of carbon trading policy on the development of the green building market, this study combines prospect theory for carbon trading to build a three-way evolutionary game model of developer-government-consumer. It studies the influencing causes of green building market development under the carbon trading mechanism from the whole perspective. The study shows the existence of a carbon trading policy helps the development of the green building market. In the presence of a carbon trading market, the government’s punishment, subsidies, and the setting of carbon prices influence the development of the green building market. In addition, the percentage of carbon emissions bought, the potential benefits, and the selling price also affect the chance of consumers buying green buildings to a greater or lesser extent. This study introduces prospect theory into the developer-government-consumer three-way evolutionary game model, which enriches the research perspective of each subject’s behavior in the green building market. It provides theoretical support for developers, governments, and consumers to collaborate to promote the coordination and development of the green building market. It has policy implications for promoting the green and high-quality development of the construction industry.