On Moral Ignorance and Mistakes of Fact: a Response to Harman

被引：0
|
作者：
C. E. Abbate
机构：
[1] University of Nevada,Department of Philosophy
[2] Las Vegas,undefined
来源：
Philosophia | 2020年 / 48卷
关键词：
Blame; Moral ignorance; Consequentialism;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
Moral ignorance is always blameworthy, but “failing to realize” that P when you have sufficient evidence for P is sometimes exculpatory, according to Elizabeth Harman (2017). What explains this alleged puzzle? Harman (2017) leaves this an open question. In this article, a solution is offered.
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页码：1355 / 1362
页数：7
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