On Moral Ignorance and Mistakes of Fact: a Response to Harman

被引：0

作者：

C. E. Abbate

机构：

[1] University of Nevada,Department of Philosophy

[2] Las Vegas,undefined

来源：

Philosophia | 2020年 / 48卷

关键词：

Blame; Moral ignorance; Consequentialism;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

Moral ignorance is always blameworthy, but “failing to realize” that P when you have sufficient evidence for P is sometimes exculpatory, according to Elizabeth Harman (2017). What explains this alleged puzzle? Harman (2017) leaves this an open question. In this article, a solution is offered.

引用

页码：1355 / 1362

页数：7

共 50 条

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