Kidney exchange with immunosuppressants

被引:0
|
作者
Eun Jeong Heo
Sunghoon Hong
Youngsub Chun
机构
[1] Sungkyunkwan University,Department of Economics
[2] Korea Institute of Public Finance,Department of Economics
[3] Seoul National University,undefined
来源
Economic Theory | 2021年 / 72卷
关键词
Kidney exchange; Immunosuppressants; Pareto efficiency; Monotonicity; Maximality; Pairwise cycles and chains solution; C78; D47;
D O I
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中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
Recent developments in immunosuppressive protocols have enabled patients to receive kidney transplants from biologically incompatible donors. We propose to use immunosuppressants as a part of kidney exchange program. We introduce the “pairwise cycles and chains (PCC)” solution and show that it is Pareto efficient, monotonic, and maximizes the number of compatible transplants and the total number of transplants at the same time among all monotonic matchings.
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页码:1 / 19
页数:18
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