Efficiency and incentive compatibility in differential information economies

被引：0
|
作者：
Guangsug Hahn
Nicholas C. Yannelis
机构：
[1] Department of Economics,
[2] University of Illinois,undefined
[3] Champaign,undefined
[4] IL 61820,undefined
[5] USA,undefined
来源：
Economic Theory | 1997年 / 10卷
关键词：
JEL Classification Numbers: 020; 226.;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
We introduce several efficiency notions depending on what kind of expected utility is used (ex ante, interim, ex post) and on how agents share their private information, i.e., whether they redistribute their initial endowments based on their own private information, or common knowledge information, or pooled information. Moreover, we introduce several Bayesian incentive compatibility notions and identify several efficiency concepts which maintain (coalitional) Bayesian incentive compatibility.
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页码：383 / 411
页数：28
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