Leveraged enforcement under the EPA’s High Priority Violation Policy

被引:0
|
作者
Lirong Liu
Zhou Yang
机构
[1] Texas A&M University-Commerce,Department of Economics and Finance
[2] Robert Morris University,Department of Social Sciences
来源
Empirical Economics | 2020年 / 58卷
关键词
Air pollution regulation; Leveraged enforcement; Targeted enforcement; High Priority Violation Policy; Firm compliance; Clean Air Act; D62; Q53; Q58;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
In the environmental enforcement literature, leveraged enforcement is an important theoretical model in which firms with current violations are targeted with intensive inspections and sanctions in the future. This paper examines the effects of leveraged enforcement on facility compliance and the differential deterrence effects of enforcement. We focus on the Environmental Protection Agency’s High Priority Violation (HPV) Policy, which represents leveraged enforcement in the regulations of air pollution in the USA. We estimate dynamic panel data models using 8755 major manufacturing facilities in the USA from 2001 to 2010. Our results suggest that being classified as an HPV facility can have significant and positive effects on compliance. We also find general deterrence effects such that a given facility’s compliance rate rises with fines on HPV facilities within the same state. However, the deterrence effects of enforcement differ by HPV status. HPV facilities on average are less responsive to additional enforcement on itself and other facilities.
引用
收藏
页码:1279 / 1304
页数:25
相关论文
共 50 条