ɛ-Consistent equilibrium in repeated games

被引：0
|
作者：
Ehud Lehrer
Sylvain Sorin
机构：
[1] School of Mathematical Sciences,
[2] Sackler Faculty of Exact Sciences,undefined
[3] Tel Aviv University,undefined
[4] Tel Aviv 69978,undefined
[5] Israel (e-mail: lehrer@math.tau.ac.il),undefined
[6] Laboratoire d'Econométrie,undefined
[7] Ecole Polytechnique,undefined
[8] 1 rue Descartes,undefined
[9] 75005 Paris,undefined
[10] France (e-mail: sorin@poly.polytechnique.fr),undefined
[11] MODALX,undefined
[12] UFR SEGMI,undefined
[13] Université Paris X-Nanterre,undefined
[14] 200 Avenue de la République,undefined
[15] 92001 Nanterre,undefined
[16] France,undefined
来源：
International Journal of Game Theory | 1998年 / 27卷
关键词：
Positive Probability; Stochastic Game; Repeated Game; Play Path;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
We introduce the concept of ɛ-consistent equilibrium where each player plays a ɛ-best response after every history reached with positive probability. In particular, an ɛ-consistent equilibrium induces an ɛ-equilibrium in any subgame reached along the play path. The existence of ɛ-consistent equilibrium is examined in various repeated games. The main result is the existence in stochastic games with absorbing states.
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页码：231 / 244
页数：13
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