Equilibrium behaviors in repeated games

被引：1

作者：

Li, Yingkai ^{[1
]}

Pei, Harry ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Northwestern Univ, Dept Comp Sci, Evanston, IL 60208 USA

[2] Northwestern Univ, Dept Econ, Evanston, IL 60208 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2021年 / 193卷

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

Reputation; Action frequency; Behavior; Refinement; Concentration inequality; REPUTATION; INFORMATION;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jet.2021.105222

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We examine a patient player's behavior when he can build reputations in front of a sequence of myopic opponents. With positive probability, the patient player is a commitment type who plays his Stackelberg action in every period. We characterize the patient player's action frequencies in equilibrium. Our results clarify the extent to which reputations can refine the patient player's behavior and provide new insights to entry deterrence, business transactions, and capital taxation. Our proof makes a methodological contribution by establishing a new concentration inequality. (c) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页数：26

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