In Defense of Sophisticated Theories of Welfare

被引:0
|
作者
Benjamin Yelle
机构
[1] Northeastern University,Department of Philosophy and Religion
来源
Philosophia | 2016年 / 44卷
关键词
Welfare; Value subjectivism; Judgment subjectivism; Welfare subjectivism; Internalism; Personhood; Values;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
“Sophisticated” theories of welfare face two potentially devastating criticisms. They are based upon two claims: that theories of welfare should be tested for what they imply about newborn infants and that even if a theory of welfare is intended to apply only to adults, we might still have sufficient reason to reject it because it implies an implausible divergence between adult and neonatal welfare. It has been argued we ought reject sophisticated theories of welfare because they have significantly counterintuitive implications about neonatal welfare and because they imply an implausible divergence between the welfare of adults and that of newborns. I argue against both claims.
引用
收藏
页码:1409 / 1418
页数:9
相关论文
共 50 条