Welfare of naive and sophisticated players in school choice

被引：1
|
作者：
Apesteguia, Jose [1 ,2 ]
Ballester, Miguel A. [3 ]
机构：
[1] ICREA, Barcelona 08005, Spain
[2] Univ Pompeu Fabra, Dept Econ, Barcelona 08005, Spain
[3] Univ Autonoma Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2012年 / 115卷 / 02期
关键词：
School choice; Naive players; Welfare; Veil of ignorance; BOSTON MECHANISM;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.032
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2011) show that some naive participants may be better off under the Boston mechanism than under deferred acceptance. Here we show that under the veil of ignorance all naive students may prefer the Boston mechanism. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：172 / 174
页数：3
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