Coalitional strategy-proofness and resource monotonicity for house allocation problems

被引:0
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作者
Onur Kesten
机构
[1] Carnegie Mellon University,Tepper School of Business
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关键词
Indivisible goods; Strategy-proofness; Resource monotonicity;
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摘要
We consider the problem of allocating houses to agents when monetary compensations are not allowed. We present a simple and independent proof of a result due to Ehlers and Klaus (Int J Game Theory 32:545–560, 2004) that characterizes the class of rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, resource monotonicity and nonbossiness.
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页码:17 / 21
页数:4
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