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Coalitional strategy-proofness and resource monotonicity for house allocation problems

被引：0
|
作者：
Onur Kesten
机构：
[1] Carnegie Mellon University,Tepper School of Business
来源：
International Journal of Game Theory | 2009年 / 38卷
关键词：
Indivisible goods; Strategy-proofness; Resource monotonicity;
D O I：
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中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
We consider the problem of allocating houses to agents when monetary compensations are not allowed. We present a simple and independent proof of a result due to Ehlers and Klaus (Int J Game Theory 32:545–560, 2004) that characterizes the class of rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, resource monotonicity and nonbossiness.
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页码：17 / 21
页数：4
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