A note on the nucleolus and the kernel of the assignment game

被引：0
|
作者：
Marina Núñez
机构：
[1] University of Barcelona,Department of Actuarial, Financial and Economic Mathematics and CREB
来源：
International Journal of Game Theory | 2004年 / 33卷
关键词：
assignment game; core; kernel; nucleolus;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
There exist coalitional games with transferable utility which have the same core but different nucleoli. We show that this cannot happen in the case of assignment games. Whenever two assignment games have the same core, their nucleoli also coincide. To show this, we prove that the nucleolus of an assignment game coincides with that of its buyer–seller exact representative.
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页码：55 / 65
页数：10
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