An Ontological Sketch for Robust Non-Reductive Realists

被引：0
|
作者：
Bruno Niederbacher
机构：
[1] University of Innsbruck,Department of Christian Philosophy
来源：
Topoi | 2018年 / 37卷
关键词：
Moral property; Moral laws; Ontological status; Parfit’s non-metaphysical cognitivism; Light moral ontology;
D O I：
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学科分类号：
摘要：
The aim of this article is to draw a sketch of an ontology for Realist Non-Naturalist Cognitivists. A distinction is made between moral property-universals and moral property-particulars. It is argued, first, that moral property-universals have the same ontological status as non-moral property-universals; second, that moral property-universals have many instances in the spatio-temporal world; third that these moral property-instances or -particulars have the same ontological status as non-moral property-particulars.
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页码：549 / 559
页数：10
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