Incentive Contract and Weather Risk

被引：0
|
作者：
Patrice Loisel
Bernard Elyakime
机构：
[1] Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA),
[2] UMR Analyse des Systèmes et Biométrie,undefined
[3] Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA),undefined
[4] Unité Economie et Sociologie Rurales (E.S.R.),undefined
来源：
Environmental and Resource Economics | 2006年 / 35卷
关键词：
ecosystem service; incentive contract; moral hazard; risk; weather; D8; Q2;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
We study contracts designed to remunerate a farmer for the production of an ecosystem service with the payment dependent on the results of the farmer’s actions and on weather conditions. Two contracts are proposed: the first takes into account both the results of the farmer’s actions and a weather variable that reflects the actual atmospheric conditions during the life of the contract; the second bases the payment on the results alone incorporating only the average effect of weather. Social welfare is optimal when both the results and the specific atmospheric conditions are taken into account; however, this type of contract may be less acceptable to the farmer due to his perception of the level of risk involved.
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页码：99 / 108
页数：9
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