An exploratory analysis of incentive packages and managerial performance

被引:0
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作者
Iryna Alves
Sofia M. Lourenço
机构
[1] CSG Research Center,ISCAL Lisbon Accounting and Business School, Lisbon Polytechnic Institute, ISEG Lisbon School of Economics and Management, Universidade de Lisboa, and ADVANCE
[2] CSG Research Center,ISEG Lisbon School of Economics and Management, Universidade de Lisboa, and ADVANCE
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关键词
Incentives; Packages; Non-monetary incentives; Performance; fsQCA;
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摘要
This study explores the interplay among different types of incentives (monetary incentives, non-monetary incentives, and benefits) and managerial performance. We collect data via a questionnaire and use qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to analyze them. Using data from 614 managers, we identify multiple incentive packages that are consistently related to high managerial performance. Specifically, our analyses reveal that non-monetary incentives in the form of autonomy and development opportunities are as related to high performance in isolation as their combination with recognition. High performance can also be achieved with the combination of traditional tangible benefits with (1) social support benefits and recognition or with (2) monetary incentives. Finally, our findings suggest that monetary incentives, social benefits, and autonomy and development opportunities are more important for the success of CFOs than to non-CFOs. Conversely, tangible benefits are particularly relevant for the high performance of non-CFOs but not for CFOs. Our findings contribute to the incentives literature by showing successful incentive packages that companies are using in practice and how they relate to different theories such as agency theory, self-determination theory, and human capital theory.
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页码:377 / 409
页数:32
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