Corporate social responsibility and strategic relationships

被引：1
|
作者：
Hino Y. [1 ]
Zennyo Y. [2 ]
机构：
[1] Graduate School of Business Administration, Kobe University, 2-1 Rokkodai, Kobe, 657-8501, Nada-ku
[2] Faculty of Economics, Osaka University of Economics, 2-2-8 Osumi, Osaka, 533-8533, Higashiyodogawa-ku
来源：
International Review of Economics | 2017年 / 64卷 / 3期
基金：
日本学术振兴会;
关键词：
Corporate social responsibility; Cournot; Strategic complement; Strategic substitute;
D O I：
10.1007/s12232-016-0267-y
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
We analyze a delegation game relevant to the conduct of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in which the firm’s owner offers the manager a contract consisting of firm profit and social welfare. We derive three results that distinctly differ from existing findings. First, CSR decisions are strategic complements for firms. Second, with simultaneous CSR decisions, the equilibrium price is equal to marginal cost, despite the fact that firms compete in a Cournot duopoly. Finally, with sequential CSR decisions, unlike the follower firm, the leader firm never exhibits CSR. However, the follower firm can enjoy a profit equal to that derived by the leader in a Cournot–Stackelberg game. © 2017, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
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页码：231 / 244
页数：13
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