We examine conditions under which an exclusive license granted by the upstream producer of a component that some consumers regard as essential to one of two potential suppliers of a downstream platform market can make the unlicensed supplier unprofitable, although both firms would be profitable if both were licensed. If downstream varieties are close substitutes, an exclusive license need not be exclusionary. If downstream varieties are highly differentiated, an exclusive license is exclusionary, but it is not in the interest of the upstream firm to grant an exclusive license. For intermediate levels of product differentiation, an exclusive license is exclusionary and maximizes the upstream firm’s payoff.
机构:
Guru Nanak Dev Univ, Ctr Study Social Exclus & Inclus Policy, Amritsar, Punjab, IndiaGuru Nanak Dev Univ, Ctr Study Social Exclus & Inclus Policy, Amritsar, Punjab, India
机构:
Univ Bologna 1, Dipartimento Sci Econom, Alma Mater Studiorum, I-40126 Bologna, ItalyUniv Bologna 1, Dipartimento Sci Econom, Alma Mater Studiorum, I-40126 Bologna, Italy
Carroni, Elias
Madio, Leonardo
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Univ Padua, Dept Econ & Management, I-35123 Padua, ItalyUniv Bologna 1, Dipartimento Sci Econom, Alma Mater Studiorum, I-40126 Bologna, Italy
Madio, Leonardo
Shekhar, Shiva
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Tilburg Univ, TiSEM Tilburg Sch Econ & Management, NL-5037 AB Tilburg, NetherlandsUniv Bologna 1, Dipartimento Sci Econom, Alma Mater Studiorum, I-40126 Bologna, Italy