A note on the nucleolus for 2-convex TU games

被引：0
|
作者：
Theo S. H. Driessen
Dongshuang Hou
机构：
[1] University of Twente,Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science, Department of Applied Mathematics
[2] Northwestern Polytechnical University,Department of Applied Mathematics
来源：
International Journal of Game Theory | 2010年 / 39卷
关键词：
Cooperative game; 2-convex ; -person game; Core; Nucleolus; Primary 91A12;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
For 2-convex n-person cooperative TU games, the nucleolus is determined as some type of constrained equal award rule. Its proof is based on Maschler, Peleg, and Shapley’s geometrical characterization for the intersection of the prekernel with the core. Pairwise bargaining ranges within the core are required to be in equilibrium. This system of non-linear equations is solved and its unique solution agrees with the nucleolus.
引用
收藏
页码：185 / 189
页数：4
相关论文
共 50 条
12345