Decision-making and coordination of green supply chain with corporate social responsibility under loss aversion

This paper takes a two-level green supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer as the research object, and investigates the influence of loss aversion preference and corporate social responsibility (CSR) on the optimal pricing, green decision-making and performance of supply chain members. Firstly, the basic game models under three different decision-making situations are constructed, and the optimal decision of the above models is obtained. Secondly, the results of different decision-making models are compared, and the influence of corporate social responsibility level and loss aversion preference on supply chain decision-making and performance is analyzed. Finally, in order to improve the performance of supply chain, a combined contract of revenue sharing and responsibility sharing is designed to coordinate the green supply chain under different preferences of the manufacturer. The results show that the retailer undertaking CSR is conducive to the green development of the supply chain, but the loss aversion preference of the manufacturer will have a negative impact on the supply chain members. In addition, when the manufacturer has rational preference, with the improvement of the retailer’s CSR level, the effective coordination interval length of coordination factors under combined contracts increases, and the coordination flexibility of supply chain increases. When the manufacturer loss aversion preference, the upper and lower limits of the coordination factor of the combined contract will increase with the increase of loss aversion preference, and the length of the coordination interval will decrease, which will lead to the difficulty of cooperation among supply chain members.