Lorenz Dominance and Non-welfaristic Redistribution

被引:0
|
作者
Roland Iwan Luttens
Dirk Van de gaer
机构
[1] Ghent University,SHERPPA
[2] CORE,undefined
来源
Social Choice and Welfare | 2007年 / 28卷
关键词
Income Inequality; Income Distribution; Lorenz Dominance; Equivalent Mechanism; Rich Individual;
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学科分类号
摘要
Our concern is for income inequalities that may result from non-welfaristic redistribution schemes. We show that for large classes of income functions Lorenz dominance results can be found in the comparison of two egalitarian equivalent mechanisms. Comparisons of different conditionally egalitarian mechanisms only yield poverty dominance results. In general, no egalitarian equivalent mechanism can be Lorenz dominated by a conditionally egalitarian mechanism. Our analysis stresses the need for accurate empirical estimates of the pre-tax income function and of the distributions of responsibility and compensation characteristics.
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页码:281 / 302
页数:21
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