Decision-making in organizations: when to delegate and whom to delegate

被引:0
|
作者
Stefan Ambec
Michel Poitevin
机构
[1] Université de Toulouse,LERNA, Toulouse School of Economics
[2] Université de Montréal,Département de sciences économiques, CIREQ, CIRANO
来源
Review of Economic Design | 2016年 / 20卷
关键词
Organizations; Mechanism design; Decentralization; Incentives; Non-commitment; D02; D82; D86;
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学科分类号
摘要
A production process involves a principal and two privately informed agents. Production requires coordinated decision making. It might be carried in a centralized organization or through delegated contracting in a hierarchical structure. We compare the performance of different organizational structures when renegotiation of initial contracts is possible. We show that delegated contracting always dominates centralization if the downstream contract between the agents is observable. Contracting (resp. control) should be delegated to the agent with the least (resp. most) important information. If downstream contracts are not observable, we obtain a tradeoff between centralization and delegation.
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页码:115 / 143
页数:28
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