Decision-making in organizations: when to delegate and whom to delegate

被引:1
|
作者
Ambec, Stefan [1 ]
Poitevin, Michel [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Toulouse, Toulouse Sch Econ, LERNA, Toulouse, France
[2] Univ Montreal, CIRANO, CIREQ, Dept Sci Econ, Montreal, PQ H3C 3J7, Canada
关键词
Organizations; Mechanism design; Decentralization; Incentives; Non-commitment; MECHANISM DESIGN; DECENTRALIZATION; CENTRALIZATION; COMMUNICATION; ALLOCATION; INCENTIVES; CONTRACT;
D O I
10.1007/s10058-015-0185-6
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
A production process involves a principal and two privately informed agents. Production requires coordinated decision making. It might be carried in a centralized organization or through delegated contracting in a hierarchical structure. We compare the performance of different organizational structures when renegotiation of initial contracts is possible. We show that delegated contracting always dominates centralization if the downstream contract between the agents is observable. Contracting (resp. control) should be delegated to the agent with the least (resp. most) important information. If downstream contracts are not observable, we obtain a tradeoff between centralization and delegation.
引用
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页码:115 / 143
页数:29
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