Arrows for secure information flow

被引:28
|
作者
Li, Peng [1 ]
Zdancewic, Steve [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Penn, Dept Comp & Informat Sci, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA
关键词
Information flow; Security; Haskell; Arrows; Type systems; Combinators;
D O I
10.1016/j.tcs.2010.01.025
中图分类号
TP301 [理论、方法];
学科分类号
081202 ;
摘要
This paper presents an embedded security sublanguage for enforcing information-flow policies in the standard Haskell programming language. The sublanguage provides useful information-flow control mechanisms including dynamic security lattices, run-time code privileges and declassification all without modifying the base language. This design avoids the redundant work of producing new languages, lowers the threshold for adopting security-typed languages, and also provides great flexibility and modularity for using security-policy frameworks. The embedded security sublanguage is designed using a standard combinator interface called arrows. Computations constructed in the sublanguage have static and explicit control-flow components, making it possible to implement information-flow control using static-analysis techniques at run time, while providing strong security guarantees. This paper presents a formal proof that our embedded sublanguage provides noninterference, a concrete Haskell implementation and an example application demonstrating the proposed techniques.(1) (c) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1974 / 1994
页数:21
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