Against the Mind Argument

被引：3

作者：

Graham, Peter A. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Massachusetts, Dept Philosophy, Amherst, MA 01003 USA

来源：

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES | 2010年 / 148卷 / 02期

关键词：

Free will; The Mind Argument; Consequence Argument; Determinism; Indeterminism;

D O I：

10.1007/s11098-008-9294-1

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

The Mind Argument is an argument for the incompatibility of indeterminism and anyone's having a choice about anything that happens. Peter van Inwagen rejects the Mind Argument not because he is able to point out the flaw in it, but because he accepts both that determinism is incompatible with anyone's having a choice about anything that happens and that it is possible for someone to have a choice about something that happens. In this paper I first diagnose and clear up a confusion in recent discussions of the Mind Argument and then go on to show why it is a bad argument.

引用

页码：273 / 294

页数：22

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