I argue, in opposition to recent criticism by Helen Longino and Richmond Campbell, that standpoint theory is needed for a feminist account of knowledge. Its recently emerging empiricist tendencies do not make it redundant and unnecessarily confrontational. Feminist empiricism directs us to seek out different perspectives, and standpoint theory enhances empirical resources by increasing the variety of available perspectives through redressing political marginalization. Standpoint theory aims to counteract the deleterious affects of oppression on the availability of unique resources for knowledge, which cannot be achieved on a strictly empiricist account. Nancy Hartsock's article "The Feminist Standpoint: Towards a Specifically Feminist Historical Materialism," from the first collection of feminist epistemology, Discovering Reality (1983a), is the locus classicus of standpoint theory. Since then, however, standpoint theory has metamorphosed such that it is in many ways unrecognizable as Hartsock's approach, and its similarity to the theories known as "feminist empiricism" is increasingly apparent. Standpoint theory is grounded in the materialism of its Marxian origins and so is committed in its inception to a version of empiricism: knowledge depends on experience. More specifically, standpoint theory is increasingly like feminist empiricism in viewing greater experience as enhancing the quality of knowledge.
