Decentralized Charging Coordination of Plug-in Electric Vehicles Based on Reverse Stackelberg Game

This paper proposes a decentralized hierarchical price function design for charging coordination of Plug-in Electric Vehicles (PEVs) based on the reverse Stackelberg mechanism. We consider an aggregator who purchases energy from the wholesale energy market. The aggregator acts as the leader for a group of PEVs and determines the price of energy versus consumption at each hour a day as its decision function. In the followers level, the optimal charging strategies of the PEVs are coupled through the electricity price. The PEVs in a group are considered to cooperate in finding their Nash-Pareto-optimal charging strategy, by minimizing a social cost function. We propose a decentralized algorithm by combination of mean-filed control and reverse Stackelberg game to find an optimal linear price function while the followers' strategies converge to epsilon(N)-Nash equilibrium point of the game.