How to reduce overpackaging of food in China: Analysis based on evolutionary game

被引:6
|
作者
Lin, Junfeng [1 ]
机构
[1] Shenzhen Univ, Coll Math & Stat, Shenzhen 518060, Peoples R China
关键词
Food overpackaging; Evolutionary game; Government penalty; Environmental publicity; CONSUMERS; RESPONSES; PUNISHMENT; EXPERIENCE; ATTITUDES; PRODUCTS; DYNAMICS; HOME;
D O I
10.1016/j.spc.2022.03.012
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
At the beginning of the 21st century, China was calling for a reduction in packages, but to this day overpackaging of food in China remains a serious problem. It is widely believed that the government needs further legislation, and researchers also think that consumers' environmental awareness should be raised. Focusing on food overpackaging, this paper develops a tripartite evolutionary game model of government, enterprises, and consumers, and introduces the effort level of government enforcement and publicity to explore the best strategy for government. The results show that (1) the government must adopt penalties and environmental publicity, otherwise, it is difficult to develop an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) that enterprises give up overpackaging by only relying on consumers' power. (2) The increase of the initial size of government and the environmental awareness of consumers have significant positive effects on promoting enterprises to return to normal packaging, but the increase of the initial proportion of consumers against overpackaging does not always forward the evolution of the government. (3) Best strategy for government is primarily influenced by the initial size of government and consumers. When the initial sizes rise, enforcement needs to improve while environmental publicity is adjusted to a basic level, which allows the government to achieve both low-cost and environmental goals. This study provides theoretical and practical values for reducing food overpackaging in China, and the conclusions provide a reference for the government to formulate effective packaging policies.(c) 2022 Institution of Chemical Engineers. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:529 / 545
页数:17
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