How to reduce construction risks in rural areas: an evolutionary game analysis

被引:0
|
作者
Chen, Wei [1 ]
Yang, Zhuzhang [1 ]
Yan, Hang [1 ]
Zhao, Ying
机构
[1] Wuhan Univ Technol, Sch Civil Engn & Architecture, Wuhan, Peoples R China
关键词
Rural self-built houses; Households; Workmen; Rural village committee; Government; Evolutionary game; Strategy; PERCEPTION; WORKERS; SAFETY; CHINA; SETTLEMENT; BEHAVIOR; VILLAGE; CONTEXT;
D O I
10.1108/ECAM-07-2023-0714
中图分类号
T [工业技术];
学科分类号
08 ;
摘要
PurposeThe construction industry is widely recognized as one of the most hazardous sectors in the world. Despite extensive research on safety management, a critical issue remains that insufficient attention is devoted to safety practices in rural areas. Notably, accidents frequently occur during the construction of rural self-built houses (RSH) in China. Safety management tends to be overlooked due to the perceived simplicity of the construction process. Furthermore, it is essential to acknowledge that China currently lacks comprehensive laws and regulations governing safety management in RSH construction. This paper aims to analyze the behavior of key stakeholders (including households, workmen, rural village committee and the government) and propose recommendations to mitigate safety risks associated with RSH construction.Design/methodology/approachThis paper applies evolutionary game theory to analyze the symbiotic evolution among households, workmen and rural village committee, in situations with or without government participation. Additionally, numerical simulation is utilized to examine the outcomes of various strategies implemented by the government.FindingsWithout government participation, households, workmen, and rural village committee tend to prioritize maximizing apparent benefits, often overlooking the potential safety risks. Numerical simulations reveal that while government involvement can guide these parties towards safer decisions, achieving the desired outcomes necessitates the adoption of reasonable and effective strategies. Thus, the government needs to offer targeted subsidies to these stakeholders.Originality/valueConsidering that during the construction phase, stakeholders are the main administrators accountable for safety management. However, there exists insufficient research examining the impact of stakeholder behavior on RSH construction safety. This study aims to analyze the behavior of stakeholders about how to reduce the safety risks in building RSH. Thus, the authors intend to contribute to knowledge in this area by establishing evolutionary game model. Firstly, this study carried out a theoretical by using tripartite evolutionary game to reveal the reasons for the high safety risk during building RSH. Practically, this research points out the important role of households, workmen and rural village committee in improving safety management in rural areas. Besides, some suggestions are proposed to the government about how to reduce construction safety risks in rural areas.
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页数:27
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