The stationary equilibrium of three-person coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: a classification

被引：4
|
作者：
Okada, Akira [1 ]
机构：
[1] Hitotsubashi Univ, Grad Sch Econ, Tokyo 1868601, Japan
来源：
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY | 2014年 / 43卷 / 04期
基金：
日本学术振兴会;
关键词：
Non-cooperative bargaining; Coalitional game; Three-person game; Random proposer; Core; Marginal contribution;
D O I：
10.1007/s00182-014-0413-2
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We present a classification of all stationary subgame perfect equilibria of the random proposer model for a three-person cooperative game according to the level of efficiency. The efficiency level is characterized by the number of "central" players who join all equilibrium coalitions. The existence of a central player guarantees asymptotic efficiency. The marginal contributions of players to the grand coalition play a critical role in their expected equilibrium payoffs.
引用
收藏
页码：953 / 973
页数：21
相关论文
共 34 条
1234