Disclosure policy in a multi-prize all-pay auction with stochastic abilities

被引：24
|
作者：
Fu, Qiang [1 ]
Jiao, Qian [2 ]
Lu, Jingfeng [3 ]
机构：
[1] Natl Univ Singapore, Dept Business Policy, Singapore 117592, Singapore
[2] Sun Yat Sen Univ, Lingnan Coll, Guangzhou 510275, Guangdong, Peoples R China
[3] Natl Univ Singapore, Dept Econ, Singapore 117570, Singapore
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2014年 / 125卷 / 03期
基金：
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词：
All-pay auction; Disclosure; Concealment; Stochastic abilities; CONTESTS;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2014.10.014
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper investigates whether a contest organizer should disclose private information about bidders' abilities in a multi-prize all-pay auction. Bidders' abilities are randomly distributed and observed by the contest organizer; the organizer decides whether to disclose this information publicly. We find that concealing the information elicits higher expected total effort, regardless of the distribution of abilities. In addition, we find that the rent-dissipation rate of the contest does not depend on the disclosure policy. (c) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：376 / 380
页数：5
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