Dynamic Game Model of Endogenous Growth with Consumption Externalities

被引：3
|
作者：
Hori, K. [1 ]
Shibata, A. [1 ]
机构：
[1] Kyoto Univ, Inst Econ Res, Sakyo Ku, Kyoto 6068501, Japan
来源：
JOURNAL OF OPTIMIZATION THEORY AND APPLICATIONS | 2010年 / 145卷 / 01期
关键词：
Differential games; Consumption externalities; Endogenous growth; Open-loop Nash equilibrium; Feedback Nash equilibrium; PUBLIC-GOODS; CAPITAL ACCUMULATION; HABIT FORMATION; EQUILIBRIA; PROVISION; RESOURCE; JONESES; PRICES; INCOME;
D O I：
10.1007/s10957-009-9631-3
中图分类号：
C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];
学科分类号：
070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要：
This paper introduces consumption externalities into an endogenous growth model of common capital accumulation and characterizes balanced growth equilibria. Contrary to the standard argument in previous studies, we show that the growth rate in a feedback Nash equilibrium can be higher than that in an open-loop Nash equilibrium if agents strongly admire the consumption of others. This result is irrelevant to whether preferences exhibit "keeping up with the Joneses" or "running away from the Joneses".
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页码：93 / 107
页数：15
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