Bidder earnings forecasts in mergers and acquisitions

被引:14
|
作者
Amel-Zadeh, Amir [1 ]
Meeks, Geoff [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Oxford, Said Business Sch, Pk End St, Oxford OX1 1HP, England
[2] Univ Cambridge, Judge Business Sch, Trumpington St, Cambridge CB2 1AG, England
关键词
Pro-forma earnings forecasts; Mergers and acquisitions; Voluntary disclosure; Merger forecasts; Earnings per share; Accretion; Dilution; VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE; MARKET VALUATION; MANAGEMENT; STOCK; MODELS; FIRMS; SPECIFICATION; INFORMATION; ENVIRONMENT; RETURNS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2019.06.002
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This study finds that pro-forma earnings forecasts by bidding firms during acquisitions are associated with a higher likelihood of deal completion, expedited deal closing, and with a lower acquisition premium but only in stock-financed acquisitions. Analysts also respond to these forecasts by revising their forecasts for the bidder upward. However, the benefits of forecast disclosure only accrue to bidders with a strong forecasting reputation prior to the acquisition. Explaining why not all bidders forecast, we document a higher likelihood of post-merger litigation and CEO turnover for bidders with a weak forecasting reputation and for those that underperform post-merger.
引用
收藏
页码:373 / 392
页数:20
相关论文
共 50 条