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Bidder earnings forecasts in mergers and acquisitions
被引:14
|作者:
Amel-Zadeh, Amir
[1
]
Meeks, Geoff
[2
]
机构:
[1] Univ Oxford, Said Business Sch, Pk End St, Oxford OX1 1HP, England
[2] Univ Cambridge, Judge Business Sch, Trumpington St, Cambridge CB2 1AG, England
关键词:
Pro-forma earnings forecasts;
Mergers and acquisitions;
Voluntary disclosure;
Merger forecasts;
Earnings per share;
Accretion;
Dilution;
VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE;
MARKET VALUATION;
MANAGEMENT;
STOCK;
MODELS;
FIRMS;
SPECIFICATION;
INFORMATION;
ENVIRONMENT;
RETURNS;
D O I:
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2019.06.002
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
This study finds that pro-forma earnings forecasts by bidding firms during acquisitions are associated with a higher likelihood of deal completion, expedited deal closing, and with a lower acquisition premium but only in stock-financed acquisitions. Analysts also respond to these forecasts by revising their forecasts for the bidder upward. However, the benefits of forecast disclosure only accrue to bidders with a strong forecasting reputation prior to the acquisition. Explaining why not all bidders forecast, we document a higher likelihood of post-merger litigation and CEO turnover for bidders with a weak forecasting reputation and for those that underperform post-merger.
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页码:373 / 392
页数:20
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