Private information revelation in common-value auctions

被引：23

作者：

Mares, V

Harstad, RM

机构：

[1] Rutgers Business Sch, Piscataway, NJ 08854 USA

[2] Rutgers State Univ, Piscataway, NJ 08854 USA

[3] Washington Univ, John M Olin Sch Business, St Louis, MO 63130 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2003年 / 109卷 / 02期

关键词：

auctions; public information; information revelation; linkage principle;

D O I：

10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00012-7

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

When a seller has information that could help bidders to estimate asset value, a dictum of auction theory has been that all such information should be publicly announced to bidders. The possibility of privately revealing this information to one or more bidders is introduced. Seller in some circumstances may attain higher expected revenue through revealing his information privately. Examples show that the role of private revelation is more complex than simply generating bidder asymmetry. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.

引用

页码：264 / 282

页数：19

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