Auctions with both common-value and private-value bidders

被引:2
|
作者
Tan, Xu [1 ]
Xing, Yiqing [2 ]
机构
[1] Stanford Univ, Dept Econ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[2] Peking Univ, Natl Sch Dev, CCER, Beijing, Peoples R China
关键词
Asymmetry; Second-price auction; Monotone equilibrium; Resale; ASYMMETRIC AUCTIONS;
D O I
10.1016/j.econlet.2010.05.026
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper shows the existence of monotone pure-strategy equilibrium in auctions with both common-value bidders and private-value ones. In equilibrium, the common-value bidders bid less aggressively when there are more private-value bidders. Further, resale is discussed as an application. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
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页码:99 / 103
页数:5
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