Research on Corporate Governance Mechanism of the Product Market Competition-Managerial Incentives and Monitoring based view

被引：0
|
作者：
Tan Yunqing [1 ,2 ]
Li Yingqi [1 ]
机构：
[1] Shanghai Lixin Univ Commerce, Lixin Accounting Res Inst, Shanghai 201620, Peoples R China
[2] Fudan Univ, Sch Management, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China
来源：
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2009 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PUBLIC ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT (ICPEM 2009), VOL 5: STATISTICS AND METHODOLOGY | 2009年
关键词：
product market competition; incentive; monitor; corporate governance effectiveness;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
This paper builds and solves the Hotelling model in which the effects of competition on the monitoring behavior of shareholders are analyzed along with incentives supplied to the managers. The results show that managers are unambiguously given stronger incentives and monitored more closely in more competitive environments so that they will improve their effort level to improve the firm's operating performance. In additional, the relationship among the product market competition, piece rate and monitoring level depends on the average market share of firms: when the firm does not obtain the average market share, the more intensive competition is, the lower piece rate and monitoring level can be needed; when the firm has obtained the average market share, the more intensive market competition is, the higher piece rate and monitoring level can be also needed.
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页码：289 / 294
页数：6
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