Human-Animal Chimeras: The Moral Insignificance of Uniquely Human Capacities

被引：20
|
作者：
Koplin, Julian J. [1 ,2 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Melbourne, Melbourne Law Sch, Melbourne, Vic, Australia
[2] Murdoch Childrens Res Inst, Biomed Eth Res Grp, Melbourne, Vic, Australia
来源：
HASTINGS CENTER REPORT | 2019年 / 49卷 / 05期
关键词：
ETHICS; BRAIN; CELLS;
D O I：
10.1002/hast.1051
中图分类号：
B82 [伦理学（道德学）];
学科分类号：
摘要：
Animals with human cells in their brains raise serious ethical questions for biomedical research. In considering the moral status of such chimeras, we should assume neither that all uniquely human cognitive capacities are morally significant, nor that all the capacities we share with other animals are morally insignificant. We need a better framework for thinking about the moral status of part-human beings.
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页码：23 / 32
页数：10
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