Reputation and Loan Contract Terms: The Role of Principal Customers*

被引:73
|
作者
Cen, Ling [1 ]
Dasgupta, Sudipto [2 ,3 ]
Elkamhi, Redouane [1 ]
Pungaliya, Raunaq S. [4 ]
机构
[1] Univ Toronto, Toronto, ON M5S 1A1, Canada
[2] Univ Lancaster, Lancaster LA1 4YW, England
[3] Hong Kong Univ Sci & Technol, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[4] Sungkyunkwan Univ, Seoul, South Korea
关键词
SUPPLY CHAIN GLITCHES; CAPITAL STRUCTURE; DETERMINANTS; DEBT; CHOICE;
D O I
10.1093/rof/rfv014
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Principal customers have strong incentives to screen and/or monitor suppliers to ensure supply-chain stability; consequently, the implicit certification from the existence of long-term relationships with principal customers has reputational consequences that potentially spill over to other markets. We argue that one such consequence is smaller loan spreads and looser loan covenants on bank loans, as firms that are able to hold on to principal customers longer are perceived as safer firms by banks. We address causality and endogeneity issues via a variety of tests and find consistent results. Our study suggests that non-financial stakeholders can have important effects on the decisions of financial stakeholders.
引用
收藏
页码:501 / 533
页数:33
相关论文
共 50 条