Indirect reciprocity and tradeoff paradigms in the wake of violent intergroup conflict

Intergroup interaction can be hindered by legacies of conflict and group biases. Many studies have looked at intergroup attitudes and pro-sociality in the wake of intergroup conflict, but few have explicitly studied how the group affiliation of another person affects the willingness to interact economically, especially when the interactions concern contested issues. In this study, I investigate the effect of group affiliation on the willingness to engage in economic interactions with others among individuals exposed to violent intergroup conflict, using a sample of refugees from the conflicts in Syria and Iraq. Based on the theory of indirect reciprocity, it is predicted that the tradeoff paradigms, that is, the willingness to engage in economic transactions with another individual, will depend on previous actions of other members of that individual's group. Participants tended to adopt a communal sharing tradeoff paradigm with ingroup members, and they tended to adopt a market pricing paradigm with outgroup members. However, this was the case only for those who reported that outgroup members had taken actions to harm them or their family in the conflict. For those who reported being harmed by members of the ingroup, a market pricing paradigm was employed also with ingroup members. The results suggest that group biases and indirect reciprocity after violent conflict do not necessarily arise from group identities alone, but as a function of past interactions with outgroup members.