They Are Not All the Same! Investigating the Effect of Executive versus Non-executive Family Board Members on Firm Performance

被引:28
|
作者
Basco, Rodrigo [1 ]
Campopiano, Giovanna [2 ,3 ,4 ]
Calabro, Andrea [5 ,6 ]
Kraus, Sascha [7 ]
机构
[1] Amer Univ Sharjah, Family Business, POB 26666, Sharjah, U Arab Emirates
[2] Univ Lancaster, Management Sch, Lancaster LA1 4YX, England
[3] Ctr Family Business, Lancaster LA1 4YX, England
[4] Univ Witten Herdecke, Witten Inst Family Business, Witten, Germany
[5] IPAG Family Business Inst IFBI, 4 Blvd Carabacel, F-06000 Nice, France
[6] IPAG Business Sch, IPAG LAB, Family Business & Entrepreneurship, 4 Blvd Carabacel, F-06000 Nice, France
[7] ESCE Int Business Sch, Ecole Super Commerce Exterieur, Innovat & Entrepreneurship, 10 Rue Sextius Michel, F-75015 Paris, France
关键词
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; MODERATING ROLE; BEHAVIORAL AGENCY; BUSINESS RESEARCH; GOAL ALIGNMENT; OF-DIRECTORS; INVOLVEMENT; FAULTLINES; OWNERSHIP; DIVERSITY;
D O I
10.1111/jsbm.12535
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
Drawing on faultlines and challenging the assumption that family board members form a homogenous subgroup, we hypothesize that the distinction between executive and non-executive family board members can create faultlines that affect firm performance. We propose that the discrepancy between results and goals can activate and exacerbate faultlines. Using a sample of 421 family small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), we find a U-shaped relationship between the ratio of family executive board members and firm performance showing the consequences of relationship-based and task-related faultlines. Moreover, we find that the U-shaped relationship occurs when firms perceive that they under-achieve their objectives, whereas a reverse J-shaped relationship appears when firms over-achieve their objectives.
引用
收藏
页码:637 / 657
页数:21
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