This article considers the interaction between two types of effort in lobbying contests: effort that improves the contestant's own performance (standard rent seeking). and effort that reduces particular rivals' performance (sabotage). Due to a positive externality, sabotage is a "small number" phenomenon. Sabotage may increase lobbying efforts and the dissipation rate in lobbying contests compared to a situation in which sabotage is not feasible.
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Yunnan Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Accounting, Kunming, Yunnan, Peoples R ChinaSouthwest Jiaotong Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Chengdu, Sichuan, Peoples R China
Lin, Yan
Chan, Kam C.
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Western Kentucky Univ, Gordon Ford Coll Business, Bowling Green, KY 42101 USASouthwest Jiaotong Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Chengdu, Sichuan, Peoples R China
机构:
United States Naval Academy, Department of Economics, Annapolis, MD 21402United States Naval Academy, Department of Economics, Annapolis, MD 21402
Schmitt P.
Shupp R.
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Department of Economics, Ball State University, MuncieUnited States Naval Academy, Department of Economics, Annapolis, MD 21402
Shupp R.
Swope K.
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United States Naval Academy, Department of Economics, Annapolis, MD 21402United States Naval Academy, Department of Economics, Annapolis, MD 21402
Swope K.
Cadigan J.
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Department of Public Administration, American University, Washington, DC 20016, 4400 Mass. Ave., NWUnited States Naval Academy, Department of Economics, Annapolis, MD 21402