Sabotage in rent-seeking contests

被引：93
|
作者：
Konrad, KA [1 ]
机构：
[1] Free Univ Berlin, D-1000 Berlin, Germany
来源：
JOURNAL OF LAW ECONOMICS & ORGANIZATION | 2000年 / 16卷 / 01期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1093/jleo/16.1.155
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This article considers the interaction between two types of effort in lobbying contests: effort that improves the contestant's own performance (standard rent seeking). and effort that reduces particular rivals' performance (sabotage). Due to a positive externality, sabotage is a "small number" phenomenon. Sabotage may increase lobbying efforts and the dissipation rate in lobbying contests compared to a situation in which sabotage is not feasible.
引用
收藏
页码：155 / 165
页数：11
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