Heads I win, tails you lose: Asymmetric taxes, risk taking, and innovation

被引:5
|
作者
Albertus, James F. [1 ]
Glover, Brent [1 ]
Levine, Oliver [2 ]
机构
[1] Carnegie Mellon Univ, Tepper Sch Business, 5000 Forbes Ave, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 USA
[2] Univ Wisconsin Madison, Finance Dept, 975 Univ Ave, Madison, WI 53706 USA
关键词
Corporate risk taking; Multinational corporations; Transfer pricing; Taxation; Profit shifting; Tax avoidance; R&D; Intellectual property; Corporate investment; MULTINATIONAL FIRMS; INCOME; AVOIDANCE; DETERMINANTS; HAVENS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jmoneco.2019.04.010
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
When multinationals face lower tax rates abroad than in the US, transfer pricing strategies generate an asymmetry in the tax rates on a project's profits and losses. We show that the tax savings from transfer pricing can be expressed as a long position in a call option. We use a model to show that this transfer pricing call option leads a firm to choose riskier and larger projects than it would otherwise. Thus, transfer pricing strategies do not simply reduce a firm's taxes, they can influence the scale and types of projects undertaken. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:24 / 40
页数:17
相关论文
共 50 条