A non-zero-sum war of attrition

被引:2
|
作者
Baston, VJ [1 ]
Garnaev, AY
机构
[1] Univ Southampton, Dept Math, Southampton SO9 5NH, Hants, England
[2] Civil Engn Inst, Dept Computat Math, St Petersburg 198005, Russia
关键词
War of attrition; Nash equilibrium; game of timing;
D O I
10.1007/BF01193860
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];
学科分类号
070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
The division of a cake by two players is modelled by means of a game of timing in which the players have a probability of learning when their opponent acts. It is shown that the game has a unique Nash equilibrium when both players are non-noisy but that there are many Nash equilibria including pure ones when at least one of the players is noisy. Explicit expressions for the strategies used in these Nash equilibria are obtained.
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页码:197 / 211
页数:15
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