Follow-my-leader FDI and tacit collusion

被引:18
|
作者
Leahy, D [1 ]
Pavelin, S [1 ]
机构
[1] Natl Univ Ireland Univ Coll Dublin, Dept Econ, Dublin 4, Ireland
关键词
foreign direct investment; tacit collusion; oligopoly;
D O I
10.1016/S0167-7187(02)00091-7
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper presents a simple model to illustrate the following idea: domestic rivals may be motivated to set up foreign production in the same country because the replication of each other's foreign direct investment (FDI) facilitates collusive behaviour in the market in which they compete. This implies positive interdependence between firms' FDI decisions, i.e. foreign investment by one firm brings increased incentive for others to follow suit. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:439 / 453
页数:15
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