Competition policy, collusion, and tacit collusion

被引：19
|
作者：
Martin, Stephen [1 ]
机构：
[1] Purdue Univ, Dept Econ, Krannert Sch Management, W Lafayette, IN 47907 USA
来源：
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | 2006年 / 24卷 / 06期
关键词：
competition policy; antitrust policy; collusion; tacit collusion;
D O I：
10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.04.007
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
In this paper, I pursue three goals. The first is to model collusion in a way that is distinct from noncooperative collusion. The second and third are to develop a particular specification of a standard model of noncooperative collusion that permits explicit solution for equilibrium outputs and reversion thresholds and to extend this analysis to allow for a deterrence-based competition policy that investigates conduct based on observed high prices (investigation thresholds). (c) 2006 Published by Elsevier B.V.
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页码：1299 / 1332
页数：34
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