Strategic Interactions in a One-Sector Growth Model

被引：1
|
作者：
Fesselmeyer, Eric [1 ]
Mirman, Leonard J. [2 ]
Santugini, Marc [3 ,4 ]
机构：
[1] Natl Univ Singapore, Dept Econ, Singapore 117548, Singapore
[2] Univ Virginia, Dept Econ, Charlottesville, VA USA
[3] HEC Montreal, Dept Appl Econ, Montreal, PQ, Canada
[4] HEC Montreal, CIRPEE, Montreal, PQ, Canada
来源：
DYNAMIC GAMES AND APPLICATIONS | 2016年 / 6卷 / 02期
关键词：
Capital accumulation; Dynamic game; Growth; Investment; Technical progress; ECONOMIC-GROWTH; FISH WARS; UNCERTAINTY;
D O I：
10.1007/s13235-015-0150-6
中图分类号：
O1 [数学];
学科分类号：
0701 ; 070101 ;
摘要：
We study the effect of dynamic and investment externalities in a one-sector growth model. In our model, two agents interact strategically in the utilization of capital for consumption, savings, and investment in technical progress. We consider two types of investment choices: complements and substitutes. For each case, we derive the equilibrium and provide the corresponding stationary distribution. We then compare the equilibrium with the social planner's solution.
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页码：209 / 224
页数：16
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