Unbundling the effects of host-country institutions on foreign subsidiary survival: A case for subsidiary heterogeneity

被引:14
|
作者
Getachew, Yamlaksira S. [1 ]
Beamish, Paul W. [2 ]
机构
[1] Loyola Marymount Univ, Coll Business Adm, Int Business & Strategy, Los Angeles, CA 90045 USA
[2] Western Univ, Ivey Business Sch, 1255 Western Rd, London, ON N6G 0N1, Canada
关键词
Contracting institutions; Property rights institutions; Foreign subsidiary survival; Market seeking subsidiaries; Resource-seeking subsidiaries; INTERNATIONAL-BUSINESS; TRANSACTION COSTS; PROPERTY-RIGHTS; JAPANESE FIRMS; REAL OPTIONS; STRATEGIES; IMPACT; DETERMINANTS; ENDOGENEITY; CORRUPTION;
D O I
10.1016/j.jwb.2021.101226
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This study seeks to advance a fine-grained understanding of the relationship between host-country institutions and foreign subsidiary survival by unbundling institutions into contracting and property rights institutions as well as engaging subsidiary-level heterogeneity. We argue that the adverse effects of weak contracting institutions are stronger for market-seeking subsidiaries. In contrast, we contend that weak property rights institutions are more detrimental to the survival of resource-seeking subsidiaries. Data from a longitudinal, pairedsample design of Japanese foreign subsidiaries operating across 46 countries provide support for these arguments. The results underscore the need to better understand institutional diversity as well as subsidiary heterogeneity.
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页数:9
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